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Case No. 20170266-SC
fuj

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
KYLE SAVELY,
Claimant-Appellant,
V.

UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL and
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendant-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant Kyle Savely ("Savely") hereby replies to the Brief of Appellees
("BrAplee"), as well as the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of the
~

Appellees ("FedAmicus").
ARGUMENT

I.
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE ACT,
IN REM JURISDICTION LIES WITH THE STATE DISTRICT COURT
UPON SEIZURE AND NOTICE
Under the plain language of the Utah Forfeiture Act (the "Act"), the state district
court is granted in rem jurisdiction over property seized for forfeiture by operation of law
upon seizure of the property and notice of intent for forfeiture under Utah law.
(SavelyBr: 17).
Buried as the last argument in their brief, Appellees UHP and DPS (collectively
~

"UHP") contend that Savely's plain language argument "runs counter to traditional
jurisdiction-invoking principles and isn't clearly expressed in the statute." (BrAplee:14).

~
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~

UHP contends that properly invoked in rem jurisdiction requires "a complaint, petition, or
application," and ultimately concludes that Utah Code § 24-4-108(4 ), which provides that
property held for forfeiture is "in the custody" of the district court and subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, does not grant in rem jurisdiction to
~

the district court - the simple argument being a grant of "custody" does not equate to a
grant of ''jurisdiction". (/d.:15-17).
The Federal Amicus similarly maintains that "a filing" is required for a court to
assume in rem jurisdiction. (Fed.Amicus:2-4). Acknowledging that interpretation of the
statute requires fidelity to the plain language, the Federal Amicus suggests that the Act's
opening section contains "an unambiguous statement" that links jurisdiction to a
requirement of filing in the state district court. (/d.:6-7). The Federal Amicus also
i;

reasons that because the Act lists the various filings that a state prosecutor must submit
within 75 days of the seizure, if none of these filing are made, no in rem jurisdiction in
~

the state court ever lies. {/d.:7-8).
The arguments should be rejected.
A.

In Rem Jurisdiction Is Conferred To The State District Court Without
Any Filings Necessary

As noted in Savely's Opening Brief, when property is seized for forfeiture under
the authority of Utah law, the Act details strict procedures and limitations on how the
seized property must be handled. (SavelyBr:7-9,13-14). By design, and in order to
enforce the Act's provisions, the state district court is given authority over the res - or, in
rem jurisdiction - by bringing the property into the "custody" of the district court
2
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immediately upon seizure and notice of intent to forfeit under Utah law. While in the
court's custody, the property is subject only to orders of the court or other agency action

consistent with the Act as set forth in Title 24, Chapter 4. See Utah Code § 24-4-108(4).
In clear and plain terms, the Act further precludes any alienation, conveyance, or
sequestration of the property "until the court issues a final order of dismissal or an order
of forfeiture regarding the property." Id. § 24-4-108(1) (emphasis added). It should go
without saying that property subject to a court's orders is subject to that same court's
jurisdiction.
The Act's grant of in rem jurisdiction to the state district court is further solidified
by a thorough review of the Act's other provisions. A fair reading of Title 24 reveals a
consistent directive granting in rem jurisdiction to the state district court before any
"filing" occurs. For example:

•

§ 24-4-114(1)(a)
Seizing agencies 1 ••• may not directly or indirectly transfer
property held for forfeiture and not already named in a criminal
indictment to any federal agency or any governmental entity not
created under and subject to state law unless the court enters an
order, upon petition of the prosecuting attorney, authorizing the
property to be transferred. (emphasis added).

•

§ 24-4-104(1 )(a)
The law enforcement agency shall promptly return seized
property, and the prosecuting attorney may take no further action
to effect the forfeiture of the property, unless within 75 days after
the property is seized the prosecuting attorney: (i) files a criminal

1

Agency' means any agency of municipal, county, or state government,
including law enforcement agencies, law enforcement personnel, and multijurisdictional
task forces." Utah Code§ 24-1-102(3).
"'

3
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indictment or information ... ; (ii) obtains a restraining order ... ;
(iii) files a petition [for transfer] under Subsection 24-4-114(1);
or (iv) files a civil forfeiture complaint.
These two provisions form an unmistakable and clear directive from Utah's
legislative branch limiting the permissible actions of both the seizing agency and the
prosecuting entities. Equally clear, the state district court is granted exclusive authority to
insure compliance and to consider any proposed transfer of the property outside of Utah
authority. Indeed, under these provisions, the court is obligated to order the return ofthe
property when required actions are not taken. Thus, the court's authority and
jurisidcition are not home from a filing, but rather, exist to enforce the Act's provisions
and grant relief to property owners when there is the very absence of such filings.

•

§ 24-2-103(3)
Property seized under this title is not recoverable by replevin, but is
considered in the agency's custody subject only to the orders of the
court ... having jurisdiction.

When property is forcibly taken from one person by another, one has available all
common law remedies to seek recovery. Indeed, the denial of such an opportunity would
violate the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to courts and to due process of law.
When it is the government forcibly taking property, the necessity for meaningful due
process is even greater.2 Although the Act allows the seizure of property without a right
ofreplevin, the Act expressly provides an alternative form of meaningful access to the
courts and due process based upon the grant of jurisdiction to the state district court.

2

E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); Bank ofEphraim v. Davis, 581
P.2d 1001, 1005 (Utah 1978).
4
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And, a number of provisions in § 24-4-108, titled "Release of property held for
forfeiture on certain grounds", detail:

•

§24-4-108(3)
With the consent ofa court ofcompetent jurisdiction, the
prosecuting attorney may discontinue forfeiture proceedings and
transfer the action to another state or federal agency that has initiated
forfeiture proceedings involving the same property. (emphasis
added).

•

§24-4-108(4)
Property held for forfeiture is considered to be in the custody of the
district court and subject only to: (a) the orders and decrees ofthe
court having jurisdiction over the property or the forfeiture
proceedings; ... ( emphasis and underline added).

In these provisions, the Act acknowledges that a court has jurisdiction over the
property irrespective of any forfeiture proceedings. This makes sense since it is necessary
~

for the state court having custody and control over the property to be able to make orders
regarding it, well before a forfeiture complaint or a criminal information are filed, since
citizens have rights concerning their property that may need to be redressed immediately
upon seizure.
Overall, these provisions speak specifically to, and plainly grant, a state district
court in rem jurisdiction without any filing required.

B.

The Structure Of The Act Also Contemplates Immediate In Rem Jurisdiction
UHP and the Federal Amicus ignore the Act's plain grant of in rem jurisdiction.

The Federal Amicus maintains that§ 24-1-103(1) is the only jurisdictional provision of
the Act, and one that requires a filing. The Federal Amicus also reasons that it seems

5
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unlikely that the legislature would add an additional form ofjurisdiction in a stray phrase
buried within the act. (FedAmicus:9-10,14). UHP similarly argues that the absence of

(iJ

what they characterize as "jurisdiction invoking norms" indicate that the legislature, and
presumably the voters passing Initiative B, could not have meant what they said. Relying
(i)

on old and inapposite cases, UHP argues that jurisdiction simply does not exist until a
complaint in the traditional sense is filed. (BrAplee:8-9, 14-15-18).
To the contrary, the language and structure of the Act are consistent and clear, and
vest in rem jurisdiction with the state district court before any case is filed. As set out by
Amicus Libertas, § 24-1-103 is merely a grant of "subject matter jurisdiction" over the
subset of civil forfeiture cases. (LibertasAmicus:21-22). Under the Act's statutory
scheme, it is generally not known whether a forfeiture will be pursued in a criminal or a
civil proceeding during the first 75 days following a seizure. During that time period, the
property is in procedural limbo while the prosecuting agency makes that determination.
Depending upon the facts of a particular case, the property might end-up as a criminal
forfeiture and named in the criminal charging document filed in either district or justice
court. Hence, the "subject matter jurisdiction" outlined in § 24-1-103 is entirely
irrelevant to the court's in rem jurisdiction under such a scenario.
Critically, regardless of the type ofcase potentially filed, the Act clearly empowers
the state district court to act and issue orders concerning the property in the absence of a
complaint or any other action. This grant of jurisdiction is designed to provide a citizen
some means ofredress and applies to all forms of forfeitures. For instance, under

6
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~

§ 24-4-108(5)(a), a claimant may obtain release of property held for forfeiture by posting
with the district court a surety bond or cash in an amount determined by the court or by
the parties' stipulation. Under § 24-4-108(7), a claimant may file a motion for hardship
release "in any district court having jurisdiction over the property, if forfeiture
proceedings have not yet commenced." Under§ 24-4-108(3), and only with the consent
of a court of competent jurisdiction, may the prosecuting attorney "discontinue forfeiture
proceedings and transfer the action to another state or federal agency that has initiated
forfeiture proceedings involving the same property." Section 24-4-114( 1)(a) directs
prosecutors further, requiring that if a transfer of the property to a federal agency is
desired, prosecutors must file a petition and seek permission from the district court. The
petition must make a number of showings, including in a signed declaration the basis "for
relinquishing jurisdiction to a federal agency." Id. at (l)(c)(v)(A) & (C). This provision
begs the fundamental question - if the district court does not hold in rem jurisdiction over
the property before a petition for forfeiture is filed, then why must jurisdiction be
relinqished?
All of these provisions explicitly contemplate a situation where a district court has
jurisdiction over property even when there are no pending forfeiture proceedings. If the
arguments posed by the UHP and the Federal Amicus were correct - that no jurisdiction
exists before a complaint is filed-then no protection of the citizen property owner exists
and there is no means to insure compliance with the Act's strict provisions. The
contention is absurd. Each of these provisions plainly grant the district court authority to
7
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take action upon the res, something which the court couldn't do without in rem
jurisdiction.
II.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT SUPPORTS
THE STATE JURISDICTIONAL PARADIGM

The Utah legislature has been given multiple opportunities to change the Act's
foundational provisions, but instead, has repeatedly put their stamp of approval on the
jurisdictional paradigm created by Initiative B. Careful consideration of the Act as a
whole, as well as its history, reveals what was intended - priority state jurisdiction over
property seized for forfeiture.
A.

Kennard Is A Canard
UHP's primary argument focuses on the federal district court's decision in

Kennard v. Leavitt, 246 F .Supp.2d 1177 (D. Utah 2002). In Kennard, various law

enforcement groups challenged the constitutionality of the then-newly-enacted Initiative
B. One of law enforcement's claims was that the requirement for a transfer order
conflicted with federal law, and therefore, the forfeiture statute was facially invalid under
the Supremacy Clause. See id. at 1182. After the Utah Supreme Court refused to certify
the question, the federal district court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of Utah's
forfeiture statute, stating that it "believe[d]" that no state transfer order was required
(fV

''when the seizing agency or prosecuting attorney is already under a federal forfeiture
order." Id.

8
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After Kennard, the Utah legislature made amendments to the forfeiture provisions
in 2004, but did not make any changes to the transfer provisions. Relying on this
perceived inaction, UHP argues that the legislature implicitly ratified the federal court's
interpretation of the transfer provisions by its acquiescence. (BrAplee:7-8,12-14). There
are numerous problems with the argument.
Initially, UHP fails to provide any authority for the proposition that the
acquiescence canon is even applicable when a court's interpretation is not binding.
Although it is certainly questionable whether Kennard amounts to "persuasive authority",
the decision certainly did not "bind" the Utah legislature any more than it bound this
Court or any other state court. This detail is especially pertinent given the broad
recognition that while the acquiescence canon has some substance, legislative inaction is
"a weak reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent," see McKenna v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 665 (3rd Cir. 1980), and "a poor beacon to follow in

discerning the proper statutory route." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969). Nor
does UHP show that Kennard had such an impact on the legal landscape that the
legislature can be presumed to have known of it and endorsed it. Jama v. L C.E., 543 US
335, 349 (2005).
UHP' s argument also fails to account for context. The issue before the federal
~

district court in Kennard was the facial constitutionality of Utah's forfeiture law. In this
context, the only way the law enforcement plaintiffs could prevail was if they showed
"that no set of circumstances exist under which" the forfeiture law was valid. E.g.,

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The court needed only to determine
whether there was any interpretation that rendered the law valid. The federal court did
indeed find the Utah law valid, but expressly hedged its interpretation, stating only what it
"believe[d]" the statute to mean.
While these procedural issues are sufficient to render UHP' s Kennard argument
toothless, they are insignificant compared to the substantive problems with their
arguments. Under UHP's reading, the Act's grant of in rem jurisdiction to the state courts

Gw

and the restrictions on transfers are ambiguous. However, trekking down this path of
"legislative intent" does not support UHP' s cause.

B.

4v

Initiative B Evinced A Clear Intent To Restrict Transfers And To Keep
Property Within State Court Jurisdiction
The genesis of the current Act is Initiative B, passed by voters in 2000. Under the

~

initiative, property was "deemed to be 'seized' whenever any agency takes possession
... or exercises any degree of control over the property." Utah Code § 24-1-15( I) (200 I).
Once seized, state agencies and officers were prohibited from transferring, "directly or
indirectly," without a court order. Id. § 24-1-15(2)(a) (2001). Utah courts were given the
discretion to decline a transfer ''to the federal government if such transfer would
circumvent the protections of the Utah Constitution or" those otherwise provided by the
initiative. Id. § 24-1-15(2)(b) (2001). Failure to heed this restriction was a Class B

~

misdemeanor. Id. § 24-1-15(4)(c) (2001).
Though these provisions are plain by their terms, any ostensible doubt is expressly
~

dispelled by the explanation of the law as presented by the initiative's proponents, who
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sought to appear as amicus curiae in Kennard. 3 In their memorandum seeking leave to
participate, the proponents explained that the transfer provisions were specifically added
to keep state law enforcement agencies from circumventing state forfeiture laws "by
handing seized property to federal agencies to be forfeited pursuant to federal law, even
where seizures are accomplished exclusively by state and local agents." Memo. Support of

Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Kennard v. Leavitt, 0 l-cv-171 (June
28, 2001 ), at 7. They also made clear that ''jurisdiction of the seized property or res [is] in
state court as soon as state or local agencies take custody of the res to pursue forfeiture."

Memo. Amicus Curiae in Opp. to Plaintiff's Request for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Kennard v. Leavitt, supra., at 12-13. Because jurisdiction was automatically
extended over property seized for forfeiture, the transfer procedures were mandatory and
federal efforts to seize that property - or state law enforcement efforts to transfer that
property - would succumb to "common law principle of prior exclusive jurisdiction
[which] vests jurisdiction in 'the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property ... to
the exclusion of the other." Id. at 12-15 (quoting Penn General Casualty Co. v. Schnader,
294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935)).
Thus, according to its authors, Initiative B was designed to vest in rem jurisdiction
over any seized property in the state district court at the time it was seized, a mechanism

3

In Kennard, Utahns for Properly Protection ("UPP") was granted leave to
participate as amicus in the case. Their pleadings outline the history of Initiative B and
detail the two year process in which they researched and drafted the law with the
assistance of national organizations involved in forfeiture reform.
11
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calculatingly employed as a means to defeat any attempt to exercise federal power over
the same property. Even the pleadings filed by the Utah Attorney General in Kennard are

4iliJ

revealing:
The state judicial gate keeping function is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. Before a law enforcement agent runs off and
transfers seized assets to the federal authorities, all [the provision] asks is
that a state court judge be given the opportunity to first ascertain the
existence of an undue burden compelling the agent to do so. If the state
judge finds the existence of a valid federal forfeiture order, it is axiomatic
the judge will also find the agent faces a huge "undue burden" ifhe does
not comply with it. Without this simple gate-keeping function there is
nothing to stop a state law enforcement official from transferring seized
assets into the lap offederal authorities ...

Def Initial Trial Memorandum, Kennard v. Leavitt, 0 l-cv-171 (August 20, 2001 ), at 11.

C.

Legislative Amendments After Kennard Maintained A Clear Intent To
Restrict Transfers And To Keep Seized Property Within State Court
Jurisdiction

Of course, UHP and the Federal Amicus claim that because the legislature didn't
address Kennard' s interpretation of the transfer provisions in the 2004 amendments to the
forfeiture law, the legislature implicitly recognized the federal court's interpretation. As
shown, the contention is without merit. However, any plausible argument that Kennard
was somehow ratified by the Utah legislature is put to rest by the 2007 amendments .

.L.

2007 Amendments

In 2007, the legislature made two changes to the transfer provisions. The
legislature added a subsection stating: "When property is seized pursuant to the order of a
state district court or state statute, the state has priority jurisdiction." Laws of Utah 2007,
ch. 180, § 2 (emphasis added). It also required courts ''to determine whether the state
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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may relinquish priority jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence by considering
hardship, complexity, judicial and law enforcement resources, and any other matter the
court determines to be relevant." Id In other words, the legislature said that if something
is seized under state law, state courts have first priority to decide how to handle the
seizure, and they can only give up jurisdiction for a really good reason.
But while the actual 2007 legislative amendments contradict Kennard, the
associated legislative history shows that Kennard wasn't even on the legislature's radar.
Not once was the case mentioned during proceedings. The 2007 amendments came into
existence via a bill first offered in the senate. It was assigned to the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the bill's sponsor had a representative of the Statewide Association of
Prosecutors describe what changes the bill would make. The testimony from the
(u)O

prosecutor representative was that this bill "clarifies that the state has priority jurisdiction
over any property that is seized by state authority." Hearing on S.B. 55 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm. (testimony of Mr. Chad Platt), 57th Leg. Gen. Ses. 1:38:15 (Jan. 23,

2007). It was reiterated that state court jurisdiction "is the priority jurisdiction" and the
bill "sends that message" to the state agencies that seize property as well as to federal
officers and the courts. Id (1 :39:00). The same prosecutor representative presented
similar testimony to the House committee, testifying that the bill "makes it even more
clear that the state has priority jurisdiction, and spells it out that we have priority over any
federal agency or the federal government when it comes to these cases." Hearing on S.B.
55 Before the H Natural Resources Comm., 57th Leg. Gen. Ses. 31:15 (Jan. 23, 2007).
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The 2007 amendments leave no doubt that the legislature never intended to adopt
the Kennard interpretation by implication. In light of more recent legislative enactments,
it is clear that the legislature still very strongly holds to that view.
2013 and 2014 Amendments
Five years later in 2013, the forfeiture provisions underwent a purported
"recodification". During the only committee hearing on the bill, the committee was told
that "the bill contains the same procedures and protections that [were] previously
contained in the forfeiture statute." Hearing on HB. 384 Before the H Law Enforcement

Comm., 60th Leg. Gen. Ses. 18:10 (March 4, 2013). During the floor presentation, the
bill was again presented as a recodification with non-substantive changes that only
increased protections for those against whom forfeiture might be sought. House floor

debate on HB. 384, 60th Leg. Gen. Ses. (March 5, 2013). The reality of the situation was
something quite different. Relevant here, the 2013 bill made substantive changes that
watered-down the transfer provisions, making it easier for state agencies to pass seized
property to federal agencies. These changes did not last long. Clearly feeling duped,4 a
new bill was passed in 2014, with the specific aim to "restore[] most of the property
rights in forfeiture law that were altered" the previous year. Hearing on S.B. 256 Before

the S. Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg. Gen. Ses. 4:10 (March 3, 2014). See also, Laws of
~
4

See, Nick Sibilla, Utah Made It Easier For Cops To Seize Innocent People's
Property And Not A Single Lawmaker Voted Against It (Forbes December 23, 2013)
(available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2013/12/23/utah-made-iteasier-for-cops-to-seize-innocent-peoples-property-and-not-a-single-lawmaker-voted-agai
nst-it/#3a0d54a747a5) (last visited 3/6/2018).
14
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Utah 2014, ch. 112, §§ 2 & 5 (enacting§ 24-4-104(l){a)(iii) & § 24-4-114(1)).
Thus, the legislative intent is clear: the Utah legislature has never shown any

~

interest in making a transfer order optional and has always intended that the state courts
have priority jurisdiction over any property seized for forfeiture.

D.

Any "lnartful" Language Does Not Equate To A Lack Of Jurisdiction
Referring to § 24-4-108(4) - which states that "[p]roperty held for forfeiture is

considered to be in the custody of the district court" - UHP argues that "custody" must
mean something other than in rem jurisdiction, although never explaining what other
meaning it must have. (BrAplee: 16-17). The truth is that although the use of the term
"custody" may appear inartful, the intention is clear. In fact, prior to the 2013
"recodification," there were a number of statutes spread throughout the Utah code that
said that property held for forfeiture was "considered in custody of the law enforcement
agency making the seizure subject only to the orders of the court or the official having
jurisdiction." E.g., Utah Code § 32A-13-l 03(5) (2007). This language was specifically
used and relied upon by the drafters of Initiative B because other courts had concluded
that this same language was sufficient to secure in rem jurisdiction over property by
operation of law. See Memo. Amicus Curiae in Opp. to P latintiff's Request for

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Kennard v. Leavitt, 01-cv-171 (Sept. 4, 2001) at 11-13.
When a set phrase is copied over from another legal source, it brings with it the original
understanding. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Herbert, 2012 UT 44,, 31,284 P.3d 647. Viewed
~

in that light, the phrase and its purpose make sense.
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Also with this in mind, it becomes clear that the Federal Amicus conflates subject
matter jurisdiction with in rem jurisdiction as it argues that it is odd for one stray
jurisdictional provision to be found in § 24-4-108 while the rest are found near the front
of Title 24. (FedAmicus:9-10). Subject matter jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction are
two very different things. Subject matter jurisdiction "is the authority and competency of
the court to decide the case." Dep't ofSocial Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah
1989). In contrast, in rem jurisdiction "is the court's ability to exercise its power over" a
piece property so that it can adjudicate "the interests of all persons in designated
property." See id.; also Aequitas Enters. v. Interstate Inv. Grp., 2011 UT 82,, 10,267
P.3d 923. In rem jurisdiction is to property what personal jurisdiction is to people. See

Carlson v. Bos, 740 P. 2d 1269, 1272 n.7 & n.8 (Utah 1987). And like it addresses in rem
jurisdiction in Title 24, the legislature frequently addresses subject matter jurisdiction
separate from personal jurisdiction. 5 There is simply nothing unusual about defining
different types of jurisdiction in different statutes or even different titles.
Moreover, and in looking at the purpose of§ 24-4-108, it is understandable why
the in rem provision was lodged there. This specific section delineates the different ways
that seized property can be handled. Seized property may be returned to the person from

5

For example, Utah Code§ 78A-5-102 defines what subject matter jurisdiction a
district court has over criminal cases as§ 76-1-201, a statute in a completely different
title, defines what personal jurisdiction district courts have over criminal defendants.
Similarly, Utah Code § 78A-5-102 describes what subject matter jurisdiction a court has
over litigants in civil complaints as § 78B-3-205, another section in a different title,
delineates when personal jurisdiction is appropriate over people outside that state.
16
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whom it was seized if it might cause hardship; it may be returned because the person
offers a bond to secure its value; or it may be returned simply because the prosecutor sees
no further need to hold it in the interim. See Utah Code§§ 24-4-108(2),(5)-(11). Under
subsections (12) and (13), the property may even be sold or leased to avoid a loss in
value. In other words, section 108 includes a collection of different ways in which seized
property may be handled while the threat of forfeiture hangs over it. This same section is
as good a place as any to direct that however the property is handled, legal custody and
jurisdiction remains with the district court.

III.
THE STATE DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT LOSE IN REM JURISDICTION
UPON THE STATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT'S STRICTURES
The last significant argument posed by the Federal Amicus is that because state
~

prosecutors did not file any petition for forfeiture or transfer, the district court lost any in
rem jurisdiction it might have had over the property. (FedAmicus:16-17). The
proposition is wrong for several reasons.
First, the Act could not be more clear about what must happen when a prosecutor
fails to take one of four necessary actions within 75 days after seizure: "The law
enforcement agency shall promptly return seized property, and the prosecuting attorney
may take no further action to effect the forfeiture ofthe property." Utah Code § 24-4-104
{l)(a) (emphasis added). What does not happen is that the state district court loses its in
rem jurisdiction. Nor does the citizen forfeit his rights because the prosecutor has been
derelict in performing his duties. Instead, what the court must do after 75 days without an
17
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action being filed isto order the immediate return of the property, including an award of
attorneys fees for the citizen. The legislature very clearly provided the state district court

~

with the authority and the jurisdiction to enter such an order. And of note, the advocacy
and actions of the State of Utah in this case are arguably estopped by this very provision.
Second, the Federal Amicus cites a series of federal cases in support of their
argument, but they are not on point or distinguishable on their facts. (FedAmicus:17).6
The case most relevant here is United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, where the
Seventh Circuit concluded that an Illinois state court had not lost jurisdiction, even
though the state forfeiture petition had been dismissed. See 924 F.2d 120, 123 (7th Cir.
1991 ). The appellate court specifically explained that the existence of a p_ending state
petition was not determinative:
Both parties dance around the real issue. This case does not tum upon who
won the forfeiture "foot race" in the courts, but rather upon the fact that
there is no authority for the type of transfer between executives of agencies
that took place here. To the contrary, such a transfer circumvents
disposition of the res by the circuit court, as required by both Illinois
statutes that authorize actions for forfeiture. 7 Id. at 122.

6

Two of the cited cases provide that the state courts lost any in rem jurisdiction
they held when they ordered the property at issue returned to the property owners.
SeeUnited States v. $174,206, 320 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. One
Black 1999 Ford Crown Victoria LX, 118 F.Supp.2d 115, 118-19 (D. Mass. 2000)). That
is hardly remarkable.
The remaining case is similarly unhelpful. In United States v. $57,960, and without
any analysis of state law requirements, the court rejected a collateral attack lodged by a
pro se inmate defendant who had failed to answer the forfeiture complaint. See 58
F .Supp.2d 660, 667 (D. S.C. 1999)).
7

It is noteworthy that Utah and Illinois use similar language in their statutes:
"[p]roperty taken or detained under this Section shall not be subject to replevin, but is
18
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IV.
RESPONSE TO POLICY ARGUMENTS
UHP and the Federal Amicus also pose a number of justifications concerning their
conduct in this case, as well as make broader policy arguments as to their need to be able
to act outside the constraints of Utah law. Although this Court is able to decide this
matter without reaching these issues, policy considerations are presented that merit some
response.

A.

The Interpretation Posed By UHP And The Federal Amicus Gut The Act
As an overall general principle, the practical consequence of adopting the

arguments posed by UHP and the Federal Amicus would be to allow transfers at will and
would effectively gut any enforcement provisions of the Act. If Utah state courts do not
obtain in rem jurisdiction immediately upon seizure and notice under Title 24, then all of
the protections and restrictions in the same title are easily avoided. State agencies will be
incentivized to leave local prosecutors out of the loop entirely with an anticipatory eye to
obtaining an ex-parte federal warrant which effectively removes all state protections. The
situation is little better if state courts gain in rem jurisdiction at seizure only to lose that
jurisdiction automatically when no timely action is taken or petition is filed. State police
agencies would acquire the same unbounded discretion, the only difference being that the
state and federal agencies would have to wait 75 days before they could make their move.

deemed to be in the custody of the Director subject only to the order and judgments ofthe
circuit court havingjurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings." 924 F.2d at 122
(quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 5612 § 712(d) & (f)(3)) (emphasis in original); cf Utah Code
§ 24-2-103(3).
19
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B.

UHP And The Federal Amicus Wish To Operate In The Back Room
Rather Than The Courtroom
With specific regard to the property at issue here, UHP characterizes its position as

one "between a rock and a hard place", suggesting that they come to this matter with
clean hands and are not taking sides in this dispute. (BrAplee:l). Likewise, the Federal
Amicus entered this case with the stated purpose of trying to understand "when Utah
court jurisdiction arises to ensure the integrity of its investigations and cooperation with
the state." They continue to assert that what happened here was not yet an "adoptive
forfeiture" so any real or perceived flaws with adoptive forfeitures should not cause the
Court concern. (FedAmicus:5-6).
However, there is ample reason to treat these proclamations of good intention with
a healthy dose of skepticism. This matter has been pending for over one year and there
has yet to be offered any tenable explanation as to how this state seizure was adopted by
federal agents. At the time the Federal Amicus sought to participate in this appeal, it
~

twice claimed that at the time of the seizure, there existed both a federal component and
an active federal investigation. 8 Thereafter, the Federal Amicus represented to this Court

8

In its motion to file an amicus brief, the Federal Amicus represented that: "The
DEA requested the assistance of the Utah Highway Patrol in stopping Mr. Savely's
vehicle because the DEA believed based on its investigation that the vehicle contained the
proceeds of drug trafficking." Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief, at 1-2. It also
represented that "this case involves a common scenario: state authorities assisting federal
authorities with a federal investigation" and therefore, "[b]ecause this money is
implicated in federal crimes and is subject to federal forfeiture, the United States has a
direct interest in the disposition of those funds." Id. at 2-3. Thereafter, in response to
Savely's objection to federal participation, the Federal Amicus again represented that the
"genesis of [this]-case [was] a federal investigation" and argues that because the traffic
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for a third time that the property at issue "was involved in a multi-state, federal anti-drug
trafficking and anti-money laundering investigation" and thus, the federal government has
an interest in these funds. (FedAmicus:1,5). The Federal Amicus has since conceded that
this is not true. In an Errata signed February 7, 201 7, the Federal Amicus confessed that
its amicus brief "left the incorrect impression that this case originated with a federal
investigation. It did not." (Errata, at 1). The Federal Amicus justified: "We mistakenly
conflated the facts of this case with those of another, contemporaneous case." (Id.). The
timing of the concession is curious, however, as it was made only one day after the UHP
Trooper who seized these funds testified that, in fact, there had been no federal
involvement.9 It must also not be lost that it has been 15 months since this property was
taken and there has been no form of criminal federal filing.
Xii

Aware of the temptations presented by the practice of federal equitable sharing, the
drafters of Utah's forfeiture laws made it illegal to directly or indirectly transfer such
property. Initiative B actually made it a crime. There is simply no form ofbackroom
transfers allowed. In reality, the likely explanation for what happened here is that UHP
delivered this case to the DEA with an eye toward a later share in the bounty. But

stop "was initiated by the U.S. Drug enforcement Agency as part of a Federal
investigation ... this case did not arise from a Federal adoption of a state seizure." United
States' Resp. to Appellant's Objection to Motion/or Leave to File Amicus Brief, at 2-3.
9

On February 6, 2018, Savely went to trial on the charge of "following to close"
which was the basis for the roadside detention and search. He was acquitted by the
Summit County Justice Court, case no. 161204385 (Judgment and Docket attached
collectively in Addendum A).
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regardless of why or how the DEA became involved, there is simply no scenario under
which UHP is relieved of its obligation to follow Utah law. .lfUHP supported federal

~

intervention, then it had an obligation to seek a transfer under the procedures set forth
under Utah law. .lfUHP was indifferent towards federal intervention, they were under the
very same obligation. And, even ifUHP truly felt lodged between a rock and a hard place,
they were still obligated to plead their dilemma to the state court in a transfer proceeding,
thereby allowing all impacted parties - including the State of Utah and Mr. Savely- a
meaningful opportunity to participate.
Compliance with Utah law would have moved things out of the backroom and into

Ct,

the courtroom where the issues could be addressed. As a part of the required court
proceedings, some scrutiny of the history of events would presumably occur. 10 At a
~

minimum, the state court judge needed to conduct an in-camera review of the affidavit in
support of the seizure warrant submitted to the federal magistrate. It appears that the
entirety of the argument posed for primary federal jurisdiction is built upon this federal
seizure warrant that was granted in response to that ex-parte application, and yet there is
nothing known about what it states. (FedAmicus:2,6-7;BrAplee:3,4-5). UHP and the
Federal Amicus ask that the federal magistrate's warrant serve as the all powerful trump

10

If any party had concerns about shielding portions of the case from the public or

from Savely, those aspects could be considered under seal or in-camera. Meaningful
judicial review would have also revealed that any plausible federal claim would run
contrary to the United States' Department of Justice's own guidelines, which states: a
"state forfeiture [is] appropriate," - meaning federal forfeiture should not proceed - if
''the asset was seized by a state or local agency and state law requires a turnover order."
Department of Justice US Attorneys' Manual § 9-112.170
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card, but it is a card they insist must remain face down. And, the recent concession by
the Federal Amicus that it conflated this case with another raises questions as to what was
actually contained in the ex-parte application for the warrant. It is logical to assume that
misrepresentations made to this Court due to the "conflating of cases" were likewise part
~

of the affidavit presented to the federal court.
The transfer proceeding required by the Act, where the state judge is called upon
to ensure due process and to act as the gatekeeper, would have developed the actual facts
and history as to how any federal interest in this seizure developed. If the federal
government indeed had a superior claim for jurisdiction, and the federal magistrate had

"'

received accurate and complete information, the State judge would, after review, have
likely ordered the transfer to the federal agency as Utah law envisions. Conversely, if it
was revealed that a state notice was served on Mr. Savely which outlined state law
procedures, and that by operation of fact and law this property had at all times been
within the jurisdiction of the state court, the state court would have simply denied the
motion for transfer to the federal court. This result seems likely insofar as the record here
suggests that the federal magistrate had not been properly or fully apprised of the relevant
events and had not been informed that the property was already in the state court's
custody. 11

11

A fully informed federal magistrate would have issued something less intrusive
like a restraining order-perfectly reasonable given that the property was in the custody of
the State court and already out of Savely's control. See 21 U.S.C. 853(e) (court may issue
"a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance
bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property ... for forfeiture");
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Critically, because UHP opted to operate outside of the requirements of Utah law,
no transfer proceeding took place. Regardless of what may have been revealed as a part
of that process, they now have a legal obligation to promptly return the seized property.
C.

Any Additional Concerns Do Not Justify Non-Compliance With Utah Law

Also unpersuasive and troubling are the self-serving arguments made that the
expense, time, and resources expended in having to comply with Utah law might "deter
the state from assisting federal authorities in the first place." (FedAmicus:13, n.8). While
the federal system is surely easier and more lucrative for law enforcement, the history
behind Title 24 makes crystal clear that it was passed into law precisely to cut off the
attractiveness of such an option. To now advocate without pause that state officers might
not cooperate without some financial benefit speaks loudly to the need for the very
restrictions the Act imposes.
Finally, the suggestion is made that there could be "harm to the investigation" if
federal law enforcement is required to reveal details as part of a state transfer proceeding.
(FedAmicus:5-6). The contention is insulting, and implies that state judges are less
trustworthy than federal judicial officers. They are not. If sensitive information needs to
be filed under seal, or even presented in camera, state courts routinely and sensitively
accommodate and balance the needs of law enforcement with both constitutional and
statutory requirements.

id. at (f) (seizure warrant only available if court determines other restraints would be
insufficient).
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CONCLUSION
The UHP and the Federal Amicus approach these issues purely from the point of
view of what the government needs and with utter disregard as to how the process
impacts the citizen whose property has been taken.
Although discounting Savely' s plea to this Court as hyperbole and an unjustified
rendition of a "parade of horribles" (BrApplee:1-2), this case marches front and center in
that parade. A citizen's funds have been seized with no hearing, no showings made as to
the propriety of the seizure, no due process, no ability afforded for that property's timely
return, and one year later, no end in sight. These collaborating state and federal agencies
have engaged in all manner of contortion and mental gymnastics in an attempt to make
this clear injustice muddy.
This Court must now make clear that the desire of voters and our legislature to
protect the citizen's needs will be honored by the Utah courts.

DATED this 7th day of March 2018.

Isl James C. Bradshaw
Isl Ann Marie Taliaferro
JAMES C. BRADSHAW
ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO
Attorneys for Appellant Savely
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
,'"''
Dated: February 23, 2018
/s/ SHAUNA -½KE~
06:22:44 AM
Justice C~l,ll;,tJb~ge

.

SUMMIT COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

(j

~

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING
JUDGEMENT OF.NOT GUILTY

vs.

Case No: 165204385
Judge: KERR, SHAUNA L
February 21, 2018
Date:

KYLE ADAM SAVELY,
Defendant.

This matter was set for bench trial on February 6, 2018. The State was represented by
Ms. Ivy Telles, the Defendant was excused from the trial but represented by James
Bradshaw. At the conclusion of all evidence the parties requested that the Court take
this matter under advisement to allow the Court to review the DVD provided by the
Summit County Attorney's Office and entered into evidence as Exhibit# 1. The Court
having reviewed said DVD and having heard and considered all testimony and other
evidence presented does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
following to close on the date and time as charged. Therefore, the Court finds the
defendant, Kyle A Savely, Not Guilty of the offense of following too close.

~
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SUMMIT COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. KYLE ADAM SAVELY
CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
CHARGES
Charge 1 - 41-6A-711 - FOLLOWING ANOTHER VEHICLE TOO CLOSE
Infraction
Offense Date: November 27, 2016
Disposition: February 22, 2018 Not Guilty - Bench
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
SHAUNA L KERR
PARTIES
Defendant - KYLE ADAM SAVELY
Represented by: JIM C BRADSHAW
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

Represented by: IVY TELLES
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: KYLE ADAM SAVELY
Date of Birth: March 21, 1986
Law Enforcement Agency: UHP - ALL
LEA Case Number: 071601684
Officer Name: KADE LOVELAND
Prosecuting Agency: SUMMIT COUNTY
Citation Number: C149491987
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
CASE NOTE
Cit. Issued:11/27/2016 Reported:11/29/2016 J2204 #6

KADE

LOVELAND
PROCEEDINGS
11-29-16 Case filed
11-29-16 Judge SHAUNA L KERR assigned.
12-20-16 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance and
Entry of Plea
12-20-16 Filed: Request for Discovery
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:30
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
12-20-16 Filed: Demand for Jury Trial - Criminal
12-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
01-03-17 Issued: Delinquent Notice
Judge SHAUNA L KERR
01-03-17 Notice - NOTICE for Case 165204385 ID 12128805
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 02/21/2017
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER RD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
01-03-17 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 21, 2017 at 08:30 AM
in SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
01-03-17 Filed: Notice for Case 165204385 ID 12128805
01-19-17 Filed: INFORMATION/INDICTMENT
01-19-17 Charge 41-6A-711(1) Sev IN was amended to 41-GA-711 Sev IN
01-25-17 Filed: Def's notice was returned attempted not known
~

02-21-17 SUPPRESSION HEARING scheduled on June 08, 2017 at 09:00 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
02-21-17 Minute Entry - PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
Judge:

SHAUNA L KERR

PRESENT
Clerk:

nicic

Prosecutor: TELLES,

IVY

Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRADSHAW, JIM C

Audio
No resolution.

Case set for motion hearing.

SUPPRESSION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 06/08/2017
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:30
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
6300 JUSTICE CENTER RD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
05-30-17 Filed: Motion to Strike Suppression Hearing and Convert to
Pretrial Conference
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
05-30-17 Filed: Order (Proposed) Striking Suppression Hearing and
Converting to a Pretrial Conference
05-30-17 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
05-31-17 Filed order: Order Striking Suppression Hearing and Converting
to a Pretrial Conference
Judge SHAUNA L KERR
Signed May 31, 2017
05-31-17 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-01-17 Notice - NOTICE for Case 165204385 ID 12580320
PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
Date: 06/08/2017
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER RD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
The reason for the change is Court Ordered
06-01-17 SUPPRESSION HEARING Modified.
Reason: Court Ordered
06-01-17 PRE-TRIAL HEARING scheduled on June 08, 2017 at 09:00 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
06-01-17 Filed: Notice for Case 165204385 TC: Judge

SHAUNA L KERR

06-08-17 Note: Ann Taliaferro appeared today for a pretrial, case
continued to another pretrial in August.
06-08-17 PRE-TRIAL HEARING continued to August 01, 2017 at 08:30 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
06-08-17 Notice - NOTICE for Case 165204385 ID 12602020
PRE-TRIAL HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 08/01/2017
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:30
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
6300 JUSTICE CENTER RD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
06-08-17 Note: Reason: Discovery problems Stipulation of parties motion.
06-08-17 PRE-TRIAL HEARING Modified.
06-08-17 Filed: Notice for Case 165204385 TC: Judge

SHAUNA L KERR

06-08-17 PRE-TRIAL HEARING scheduled on August 01, 2017 at 08:30 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
06-08-17 Filed: Notice for Case 165204385 TC: Judge
~

SHAUNA L KERR

06-20-17 Note: Def's pretrial notice was returned, due to attorney
involved no attempt to send was made.
08-01-17 PRE-TRIAL HEARING continued to November 14, 2017 at 08:30 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
08-01-17 Minute Entry - CONTINUANCE
Judge:

SHAUNA L KERR

PRESENT
Clerk:

nicic

Prosecutor: TELLES, IVY
~

Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO

Audio
CONTINUANCE
Whose Motion:

ll

The Defendant.
Reason for continuance:
Correct calendar
PRE-TRIAL HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 11/14/2017
Time: 08:30 a.rn.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER RD
PARK CITY, UT

\iP

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:31
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
11-14-17 PRE-TRIAL HEARING continued to January 23, 2018 at 08:30 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
11-14-17 Minute Entry - CONTINUANCE
Judge:

SHAUNA L KERR

PRESENT
Clerk:

nicic

Prosecutor: TELLES, IVY
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRADSHAW, JIM C

Audio
CONTINUANCE
Whose Motion:
The Defendant's counsel JIM C BRADSHAW.
Reason for continuance:
Settlement negotiations
PRE-TRIAL HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 01/23/2018
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER RD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
01-23-18 PRE-TRIAL HEARING continued to April 17, 2018 at 08:30 AM in
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
01-23-18 Minute Entry - CONTINUANCE
Judge:

SHAUNA L KERR

PRESENT
Clerk:

nicic

Prosecutor: TELLES, IVY
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRADSHAW, JIM C

Audio
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:31
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case

CONTINUANCE
Whose Motion:
The Defendant's counsel JIM C BRADSHAW.
Reason for continuance:
Correct calendar
PRE-TRIAL HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 04/17/2018
Time: 08:30 a.rn.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER ROAD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR

<@

01-23-18 Notice - NOTICE for Case 165204385 ID 13290838
HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/06/2018
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER ROAD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
~

01-23-18 Filed: Notice for Case 165204385 TC: Judge

SHAUNA L KERR

01-23-18 Notice - NOTICE for Case 165204385 ID 13291078
PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
Date: 02/06/2018
Time: 02:00 p.rn.
Location: SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM
6300 JUSTICE CENTER ROAD
PARK CITY, UT

84098

Before Judge: SHAUNA L KERR
The reason for the change is Correct calendar
01-23-18 PRE-TRIAL HEARING Modified.
Reason: Correct calendar
01-23-18 Filed: Notice for Case 165204385 TC: Judge

SHAUNA L KERR

02-01-18 TRIAL-BENCH scheduled on February 06, 2018 at 02:00 PM in
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:31
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
SUMMIT CTY COURTROOM with Judge KERR.
02-06-18 Filed: Waiver of Defendants Appearance at Bench Trial

~

02-06-18 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
02-06-18 Notice

-

Final Exhibit List

02-06-18 Minute Entry - TRIAL-BENCH
Judge:

SHAUNA L KERR

PRESENT
Clerk:

nicic

Prosecutor: TELLES, IVY
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRADSHAW, JIM C

Audio
Tape Number:

2:21

Def waived appearance at trial
2:25 Trooper Loveland called as state witness
2:33 Cross by defense
2:51 Redirect by state
2:54 Cross by defense
2:57 State rests
3:06 Closing by state
3:13 Closing by defense
3:23 Rebuttal by state
3:26 Judge takes case under advisement

02-07-18 Filed order: TRIAL-BENCH
Judge SHAUNA L KERR
Signed February 07, 2018
02-21-18 Ruling-Entry - JUDGEMENT OF NOT GUILTY
Judge: KERR, SHAUNA L
This matter was set for bench trial on February 6, 2018. The State
was represented by Ms. Ivy Telles, the Defendant was excused from
the trial but represented by James Bradshaw.

At the conclusion of

all evidence the parties requested that the Court take this matter
Printed: 03/07/18 09:21:32
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CASE NUMBER 165204385 Traffic Court Case
under advisement to allow the Court to review the DVD provided by
the Summit County Attorney's Office and entered into evidence as
Exhibit# 1. The Court having reviewed said DVD and having heard
and considered all testimony and other evidence presented does not
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
close on the date and time as charged.

was following to

Therefore, the Court finds

the defendant, Kyle A Savely, Not Guilty of the offense of
following too close.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 165204385 by the method and on the date
specified.
EMAIL:

STATE OF UTAH chortin@summitcounty.org

EMAIL:

JIM C BRADSHAW jim@brownbradshaw.com

EMAIL:

IVY TELLES itelles@sumrnitcounty.org
02/23/2018

/s/ NICI CRYSTAL

Date:
Justice Court Clerk
02-22-18 Charge 1

Disposition is Not Guilty - Be

02-23-18 Filed order: JUDGEMENT OF NOT GUILTY
Judge SHAUNA L KERR
Signed February 23, 2018
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